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FOREWORD

DEFINING PRIVACY
DANIEL W. HARDWICK*

Imagine what life must have been like during the Civil War.
Without telephones, answering machines, caller-I.D., televisions,
radios or telecommunications. Without ATMs, wire-transfers,
computers or e-mails. These items change the way we live, communicate and think about the world. Alongside the impact technology has had on our lives, technology has changed the way
individuals view themselves and their community. Being alone
meant no communication in 1870. In the year 2000, Internet
advertisers can record wherever one surfs on the Internet and
create "cookies" on a person's hard drive. The police can wiretap phones with permission from judges. A telephone user can
tell who is calling him and screen his calls. Sitting alone in a
house is no longer a completely private activity. While technology may have made life simpler, it has brought the notion of privacy to the forefront of public debate.
In this modern context, it is increasingly hard to define "privacy." "Privacy" in the contemporary context does not solely deal
with an individual's relationship with the government, like
ancient philosophers viewed it; but rather, "privacy" in contemporary terms encompasses an individual's relationship with the
government and civil society, i.e. his fellow citizens (whether
friends, enemies or neither). Therefore, protecting privacy may
mean more than developing new laws, it may entail developing
new ways people think and deal with others.
Another explanation for why privacy is hard to define is that,
perhaps, "privacy" does not truly exist, and therefore, any
attempt to define it never satisfies what either the government,
the individual or the "public" is willing to live with. Ancient philosophers may have supported this claim. In Greek philosophy,
the polis, or city-state, existed for the public good and any
* B.A., 1997, Michigan State University (James Madison College); J.D.,
2000, University of Notre Dame Law School.
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attempt to hide information from the authority would be a public wrong. Plato explains in the Republic.
[I] t's appropriate for the rulers, if for anyone at all, to lie
for the benefit of the city in cases involving enemies or citizens, while all the rest must not put their hands to anything of the sort. We'll say that for a private man to lie to
such rulers is a fault the same as, and even greater than, for
a sick man or a man in training not to tell the truth about
the affections of his body to the doctor or the trainer, or
for a man not to say to the pilot the things that are concerning the ship and the sailors, or lying about how he
himself or his fellow sailors are faring.'
If ancient Greek democracies are thought of as the foundation of western civilization and modern-day democratic governments, perhaps there is no proper function or place for
advocating privacy. Perhaps individuals should be bound to disclose their private affairs for the good of the government. The
goal of e pluribus unum (out of many, one) may be to have us give
up our rights to privacy for the sake of the greater whole.
Whatever the federal constitution or the United States
Supreme Court may or may not say about privacy, nobody can
quite put her finger on what exactly privacy means. Although it
might be impossible to determine what exactly it is, we do know
that privacy is a modern day phenomena. The notion of a right
"to be let alone" was first advanced by Thomas Cooley in his
Treatise on Torts in 1880.2 In their famous article, The Right to
Privacy,3 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis began the public discussion of a separate and distinct right of privacy. The article
"reviewed a number of older cases in which relief had been
afforded on the basis of defamation, or breach of confidence on
an implied contract, in the publication of letters, portraits and
the like."4 The United States Supreme Court first discussed the
importance of protecting privacy in 1891, in Union Pacific Railroad v. Botsford:5
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all
1. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 67 (Allan Bloom ed., 1968).
2. THOMAS COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1888).
3. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REv. 193 (1890).
4. JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & ScHwAR-Tz's TORTS - CASES
AND MATERIALS 947 (1994).
5. 141 U.S. 240 (1891).
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restraint or interference by others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.6
The Supreme Court first promulgated a constitutional "right7
to privacy" in the 1965 holding of Griswold v. Connecticut.
Although the right to privacy is not specifically found in the
United States Constitution, the Court created it based on the
"penumbras"' of various amendments.
Articles in this symposium discuss privacy in such diverse
areas as cyberspace, the hospital bed, the marital bed, the courtroom, in bankruptcy cases and in business. In his article, Consumer Privacy in Electronic Commerce: As the Millenium Approaches,
Minnesota Attacks, Regulators Refrain, and Congress Compromises,
Professor Mark Budnitz is concerned about consumer privacy in
electronic commerce, a new concern for privacy advocates, yet
one that threatens the core of an individual's privacy. Professor
Budnitz examines a Minnesota lawsuit alleging that a bank violated that state's Consumer Fraud Act by selling customer information to a third party marketer. He analyzes current legislation
concerning the protection of consumer privacy and suggests the
need for additional legislation. Professor Budnitz suggests how
to improve our laws in the immediate future in order to provide
privacy protection in electronic commerce.
Professor Oscar Gandy, in Exploring Identify and Identification
in Cyberspace, challenges business practices regarding identification of consumers in Cyberspace. He points out that the use of
profiles not only threatens privacy, but inherently includes discrimination based on subjective categories. Professor Gandy
argues for a standard, general policy of handling the collection
6. Id. at 251.
7. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. Id. at 484:
[T]he Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in
the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers
"in any house" in time of Peace without the consent of the owner is
another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen
to create a zone of Privacy which government may not force him to

surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provided "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
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of information in order to protect social groups and individuals
from discrimination.
The right to privacy in an individual's personal decision is
the subject of Justifying Assisted Suicide: Comments on the Ongoing
Debate, by Professor Melvin Urofsky. The author asks whether the
right to privacy extends to one's decision to commit suicide with or without the help of physicians and directly or indirectly
through the denial of machines or intravenous feeding systems.
His analysis questions whether the government has a right to
influence an individual's autonomous decision to affect his own
life.
Professor Gerard Bradley examines what effects Vermont's
"civil union" law will have on the institution of marriage in SameSex Marriage: Our Final Answer? Professor Bradley looks at how
the once inconceivable notion of same-sex marriage is becoming
a reality. He questions whether proper dileberation has been
made on the effects Vermont's new law will have on the institution of marriage. He argues that same-sex marriages cannot be
equated with traditional marriages because they lack many fundamental attributes that define traditional marriages.
Same-sex marriages are supported by Professor Mark
Strasser in his article, Sex, Law and the SacredPrecincts of the Marital
Bedroom: On State & FederalRight to PrivacyJurisprudence. Professor
Strasser criticizes the Supreme Court for not extending the right
to privacy to protect same-sex marriages. He argues that since
current federal right to privacy jurisprudence has the family at its
core, it should protect the rights of individuals to have their
already-existing families legally recognized. Professor Strasser
alternatively argues that if same-sex marriages are not protected,
currently protected rights may not be protected for much longer.
In her article, Sex and Lies: Rules of Ethics, Rules of Evidence,
and Our Conflicted Views on the Significance of Honesty, Professor
Diane Mazur looks at the significance of honesty in American
culture with a look at the Clinton Impeachment. Professor
Mazur questions whether required disclosures of private actions
are justified and the role honesty plays in protecting an individual from unwanted intrusion.
The protection of "informational privacy," is analyzed in Privacy in the FederalBankruptcy Courts, by Mary Jo Obee and William
C. Plouffe, Jr. The authors explore how the increasing amount
of record keeping in society as a whole has led to a dilemma for
bankruptcy courts. While creditors and attorneys want, and feel
justified in requesting, all available information pertaining to
debtors, they want limited information released about them.
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Obee and Plouffe argue that the creditors and attorneys are getting the debtors' information and that the amount of information released exceeds and is inconsistent with the amount
available in other contexts.
Medical information privacy is analyzed in Professor James
Hodge's article, NationalHealth Information and the New Federalism.
Professor Hodge offers and in-depth analysis of legislation aimed
at protecting patient privacy. He points out that the regulation
of health information by administrative regulations or national
legislation raises federalism issues. While nationalization of privacy rights may be the most efficient way to protect privacy, the
rights of state and local governments to create their own laws
must be respected. Professor Hodge analyzes the argument over
the best way to protect to insure medical information privacy.
Finally, in their article, Right to be Let Alone?-Has the Adoption of Article I, Section 23 in the Florida Constitution, Which Explicitly
Providesfor a State Right to Privacy, Resulted in Greater Privacy Protection for Florida Citizens, Hon. Major B. Harding, along with Mark
Criser and Michael Ufferman, question whether Florida's Constitutional Amendment granting Floridians an explicit right to privacy actually protects the right to privacy more than other
Americans living in states without explicit constitutional protection. Also, the authors provide an analysis of how the courts have
interpreted Florida's right to privacy. They conclude that an
explicit right to privacy in the Florida Constitution has given
Floridians more privacy protection then other Americans.
How should privacy be defined? Should it be about the
right to think, feel and act as one wishes? Should it include the
right to be left alone? Or should it be a hybrid of both individual
choice and public restraint from the personal lives of individuals?
The articles in this symposium seek to answer these questions in
a variety of contexts. Each author seeks to enlighten the reader
of the conflicts privacy faces in their area of expertise. In doing
so, this symposium provides a general sketch of privacy and the
law.

